missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

operate and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system,'" id., at 412 (quoting Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied the petitions with an order stating as follows: "There are now three petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. Const., Art. 1 A desegregation order was issued by the court including details of how to remedy the situation and the financial . In pursuing the demand of justice for racial equality, I fear that the Court today loses sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed by our constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper exercise of judicial remedial powers adequate to correct constitutional violations. This Court, with full justification, has given latitude to the district judges that must deal with persisting problems of desegregation. It is, therefore, unfair to announce a foundational holding regarding Freeman v. Pittswithout giving the parties the chance to fully brief that issue. It also approved the $142,736,025 budget proposed by KCMSD for implementation of the magnet school plan, as well as the expenditure of $52,858,301 for additional capital improvements. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. U.S., at 291 U.S. 33, 68] On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." After a lengthy trial, the District Court found that KCMSD and the State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. The District Court's approval of the levy was necessary because the Court of Appeals had required it to establish a maximum for the levy. ", This case is a stark illustration of the ever-present question whether ends justify means. The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long. [The decision and disposition are not included in the casebook.]. Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990, Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. (1947). U.S. 43, 45 418 Our statement in Davis rested on the explicit holding in Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, Most online reference entries and articles do not have page numbers. The District Court declined to require the State to pay for KCMSD's obligations because it believed that the Court of Appeals had ordered it to allocate the costs between the two governmental entities. v. Evans, REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 491 U. S. 295. State laws, including taxation provisions legitimate and constitutional in themselves, define the power of the KCMSD. Even when faced with open defiance of the mandate of educational equality, however, no court has ever found necessary a remedy of the scope presented here. The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. This case involves an 18-year long litigation regarding school segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD). . Under Missouri law, the KCMSD has power to impose a limited property tax levy up to $1.25 per $100 of assessed value. This puts the conclusion before the premise. 400, 412 (WD Mo. U.S. 1, 5 433 New York City Bd. [495 This is true as well of the problems of financing desegregation, for no matter has been more consistently placed upon the shoulders of local government than that of financing public schools. R-2 v. United States, ] Although respondents do not agree that the Eighth Circuit so treated the State's papers, they do not argue the Court of Appeals lacked the power to treat the State's "Petition for Rehearing En Banc" as a petition for panel rehearing, even if it was intended subjectively and could be read objectively as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc. The State has argued here that the District Court, having found the State and KCMSD jointly and severally liable, should have allowed any monetary obligations that KCMSD It chose instead to enjoin the effect of the Proposition C rollback to allow KCMSD to raise an additional $4 million for the coming fiscal year. X, and principles of federal/state comity. of "magnet schools" to promote desegregation. 317 Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. The Federalist No. The scope of the desegregation order was also upheld against all the State's objections, id., at 1301-1307, as was the allocation of costs, id., at 1307-1308. Accepting the District Court's conclusion that state law limitations prevented KCMSD from raising sufficient funds, it held that those limitations must fall to the Constitution's command, and affirmed all of the District Court's actions taken to that point. 535 (1867); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 1. It is not a function the Judiciary as an institution is designed to exercise. As explained supra, at 43, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court in the future should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities adequate to fund its budget and should enjoin the operation of state laws that would limit or reduce the levy below that amount. The District Court further ordered the State to fund fully other portions of the desegregation program intended to reduce class size and to improve student achievement. Argued January 11, 1995-Decided June 12, 1995*. [495 Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the court's authority. 469 The KCMSD, however, devised a broader concept for districtwide improvement, and the District Court approved it. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. -547 (1972)). United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit . In fact, the District Court acknowledged in its very first remedial order that the development of a remedy in this case would involve "a choice among a wide range of possibilities." The district court stated that it would "not This direction indicates that the District Court understood that it was now obliged to allow KCMSD to set the tax levy itself. The Jacksonian Era to the Civil War, 1835-1865, From Reconstruction to the New Deal: 1866-1934, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and National Security in the Modern Era, Liberty, Equality, and Fundamental Rights: The Constitution, the Family, and the Body, The Constitution in the Modern Welfare State, LSAT Logic Games (June 2007 Practice Exam), LSAT Logical Reasoning I (June 2007 Practice Exam), LSAT Logical Reasoning II (June 2007 Practice Exam). The fact that a school is predominately black is not an indication of intentional, unconstitutional segregation. In my view, however, the Court transgresses these same principles when it goes further, much further, to embrace by broad dictum an expansion of power in the Federal Judiciary beyond all precedent. U.S. 274 Anything that is predominantly black is not necessarily inferior. -259 (1953). U.S. 247, 258 . There is no obvious limit to today's discussion that would prevent judicial taxation in cases involving prisons, hospitals, or other public institutions, or indeed to pay a large damages award levied against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. 855 F.2d 1295, Indeed, it may be that a mere 12-acre petting farm, or other corresponding reductions in court-ordered spending, might satisfy constitutional requirements, while preserving scarce public funds for legislative allocation to other public needs, such as paving streets, feeding the poor, building prisons, or housing the homeless. remand for further modifications as provided in this opinion"). ] The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that such an injunction would violate the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. . . Only after this Court's Clerk informed Jackson County that its application for extension of time was untimely did the Court of Appeals amend its October 14 order nunc pro tunc to state that there were "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court" and that those "petitions for rehearing . Rather, it affirmed "the actions that the court has taken to this point." 446 The modifications ordered by the Court of Appeals cannot be assailed as invalid under the Tenth Amendment. Oral Argument - January 11, 1995. There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. which to guide or review them. Both Benson and the LDF employed numerous paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates, and the court awarded fees for their work based on market rates, again using current, rather than historic rates, in order to compensate for the delay in payment. The Clerk informed Jackson County that although the timely filing of a "petition for rehearing" with the Court of Appeals tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "petition for rehearing en banc" does not toll the time. We also hold, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals do satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. United States District Courts. , where we stated that a District Court, faced with a country's attempt to avoid desegregation of the public schools by refusing to operate those schools, could "require the [County] Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system . Missouri v. Jenkins provides a good starting point for examin-ing the role of the judiciary in sculpting, implementing, and moni-toring a remedial plan for desegregation. [ A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when the reality is otherwise. Law School Case Brief; Missouri v. Jenkins - 491 U.S. 274, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) Rule: An appropriate adjustment for delay in payment--whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise--is within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C.S. denied sub nom. Oct 30, 1989. (emphasis added). The Court's statements, in my view, cannot be seen as necessary for its judgment, or as precedent for the future, and I cannot join Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. Jenkins v. Missouri, supra, at 34-35. The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of Brown v. Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. . 138-142. [495 [495 443 Id., at 266. 1983. U.S. 294, 299 U.S. 33, 48] U.S. 203, 205 [ PDF MISSOURI et al. v. JENKINS et al. certiorari to the united states court Decided. of Equalization, 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, supra, at 221 (State Constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation). 406 U.S. 472, 501 A suggestion made to a United States court of appeals for a rehearing in banc . See Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. `the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." In my view, a taxation order should not even be of Education, Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). 88-64 Argued February 21, 1989 Decided June 19, 1989 491 U.S. 274 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In this major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri, in which various desegregation remedies were granted against the State of Missouri and other These cases hold that where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself without authority to order taxation. 855 F.2d, at 1314. 491 U. S. 284-289. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It adopted a comprehensive magnet school program in order to draw nonminority students from private schools and the suburban districts into city district schools, and subsequently ordered salary assistance that was eventually extended to virtually all of the city district's instructional and noninstructional employees. There is no indication in the record that the District Court gave any consideration to the possibility that an alternative remedial plan, while less attractive from an educational policy viewpoint, might nonetheless suffice to cure the constitutional violation. Star Athletica, L.L.C. Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, so the surcharge is not before us. Respondents argue that the original order is more probative of the Eighth Circuit's contemporaneous treatment of the State's petition, and they contend that order clearly does not treat the petition as requesting panel rehearing. The appellate court affirmed the order with some modifications. for cases where local officers resigned. Supp., at 53-55. In such cases, of which Pink was one, "no . Missouri v. Jenkins Media Oral Argument - October 30, 1989 Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990 Opinions Syllabus View Case Petitioner Missouri Respondent Jenkins Docket no. Unlike legislative bodies, which may hold hearings on how best to raise revenues, all subject to the views of constituents to whom the Legislature is accountable, the Judiciary must grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random amici curiae. (abbr. Pp. 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below. III, U.S. Const. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). U.S. 1 Cf. was explained in Pink, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . "Proposition C" allocates one cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund and requires school districts to reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district. The Court of Appeals thus required that in the future, the District Court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). App. A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's communities. U.S. 441, 445 The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the salary and quality education program issues. 433 . this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." U.S. 33, 34] 9th Circuit. U.S., at 266 Ibid. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. However, over the 18-year span of the case, the court ordered remedies that were focused instead on improving educational facilities and programs inside KCMSD.[1]. The plan also included a "25 acre farm and 25 acre wildland area" for science study. Id., at 39-41. Although this Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed these technicalities, it cannot be concluded that the court has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring them. "The judiciary . Alyssa Barnes Case Brief- Week 11 November 15, 2021 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) Facts: The Kansas City Missouri District Court uncovered in action 42 U.S.C. . If, however, judicial discretion is to provide the sole limit on judicial remedies, that discretion must counsel restraint. The District Court thereafter issued an order detailing the remedies necessary to eliminate the vestiges of segregation and the financing necessary to implement those remedies. Jenkins cases (this case is deemed Missouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Court's involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. All we can do is to bring existing powers into operation"). 53a. Mo. (Emphasis added.) at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S. W. 2d 11 (1983). -542 (1931). The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. Last Term we rejected the invitation to cure an unconstitutional tax scheme by broadening the class of those taxed. 1485 (1984). Ante, at 57. The State argues that the funding ordered by the District Court violates principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive. U.S. 33, 77] ] The old cases recognized two exceptions to this rule, neither of which is relevant here. The Eighth Circuit ordered the District Court to divide the cost equally between the State and KCMSD. often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. 291 (1987). Jenkins v. State :: 1990 :: Missouri Court of Appeals Decisions U.S. 33, 76] Id., at 145a-146a (emphasis in original). O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined in part, post, p. 491 U. S. 289. The District Court ordered an extensive capital improvement program to rehabilitate the deteriorating physical plant of KCMSD, the cost of which was estimated as at least $37 million, of which $27 million was to be contributed by the State. (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and so permits a federal court to disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its commands. process by preventing a local government from implementing that remedy. Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the courts authority. TermsPrivacyDisclaimerCookiesDo Not Sell My Information, Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select, Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. U.S. 267 In Jenkins the Court decided that the term "reasonable attorney's fee" in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act referred to attorney work product, and thereby included work completed by paralegals. 855 F.2d, at 1315. Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Gonzalez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 773 F.2d 637, 639 (CA5 1985); Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-6. The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. 18 Footnote 5 489-502. Ante, at 51. 855 F.2d, at 1318-1319. 298 . Brief for Petitioner at 15-16. A reasonable attorney's fee under 1988 is one calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market and one that grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee," comparable to what "is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client." The KCMSD had asked the court to order the state to advance it funds for its desegregation and operating expenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks judicial power to order a tax increase. See id., at 1299 ("[W]e modify [the order's] future operation to more closely comport with limitations upon our judicial authority"); id., at 1318 ("We . United States United States District Courts. Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One. (1964), to support its statements on judicial taxation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment. 705 (1867) (mandamus to state officials to collect a tax authorized by state law The Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed the technicalities of Rules 35(c) and 41(a), but we cannot conclude from the respondents' submission that the Eighth Circuit has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring those formalities. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., U.S. 33, 43], Although the Court of Appeals thus "affirm[ed] the actions that the [District] [C]ourt has taken to this point," id., at 1314, it agreed with the State that principles of federal/state comity required the District Court to use "minimally obtrusive methods to remedy constitutional violations." We think this argument aims at the scope of the remedy rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded and thus falls outside our limited grant of certiorari in this case. (1936); Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., James Madison observed: "Justice is the end of government. Sch. X, Opinion Announcement - June 12, 1995. (1961), in which we reversed a judgment directing a District Court to decree a valid tax in place of an invalid one that the State had attempted to enforce: The notion of white flight does not justify the court going beyond its authority here. U.S. 33, 75] 345 The judicial taxation approved by the Eighth Circuit is also without parallel. . U.S. 533, 585 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. U.S. 265, 280 Had the court chosen, as the State argues, to allow the monetary obligations that KCMSD could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them, the implementation of the order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution. To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. rehearing in banc, unlike a petition for rehearing, "shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.". [495 App. [495 to Pet. to Pet. 239 It is true that in Milliken v. Bradley, Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) FACTS: Plaintiff sues Defendants claiming racial segregation. As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. The Eighth Circuit surely knows The issue of desegregation in Kansas City schools was litigated for years. Rev. [ But as respondents point out, it has also been our consistent practice to treat suggestions for rehearing in banc presented to the United States Courts of Appeals that do not also include petitions for rehearing by the panel as not tolling the period for seeking certiorari. Supp., at 45. ." We turn to the constitutional issues. million in capital improvement bonds. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, did not hold that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. The KCMSD plan adopted by the court provided that "every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92." U.S. 33, 51]. 672 F. Any purported distinction between direct imposition of a tax [495 A few examples are illustrative. The term `suggest' was deliberately chosen to make it clear that a party's sole entitlement is to direct the attention of the court to the desirability of in banc consideration. 210 It may instead be a result of families choices about where to live. 215 It makes no difference that the KCMSD stands "ready, willing, and . U.S. 531, 541 The statutory limitation, therefore, could be disregarded and the city ordered to levy the necessary taxes to pay its bonds. He argued that as the State and KCMSD were jointly and severally liable for the cost of the desegregation remedy, the District Court should have allowed any amount that KCMSD was unable to pay to fall on the State rather than require the tax increase. Missouri v. Jenkins. *. CV 09-06731 SS. Footnote 15 KCMSD was also directed to issue $150 Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., A. The Court never confronts the judicial authority to issue an order for this purpose. : distr.) -386 (1908). Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-1373 (1975) (District Court may "implement its desegregation order by directing that provision be made for the levying of taxes"); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320, cert. This is consistent with our precedents and the basic principles defining judicial power. [495 . place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. Can a court create a segregation remedial plan which has a goal of attracting nonminority students into the district? U.S. 33, 49] . able" to impose a tax not authorized by state law. U.S. 33, 56] The State maintains, however, that even under these cases, the federal judicial power can go no further than to require local governments to levy taxes as authorized under state law. [ Missouri v. Jenkins | Oyez - {{meta.fullTitle}} Griffin followed a long and venerable line of cases in which this Court held that federal courts could issue the writ of mandamus to compel local governmental bodies to levy taxes adequate to satisfy their debt obligations. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 495 U.S. 33 (1990): Case Brief The majority would limit these authorities to a narrow "exceptio[n]" Furthermore, if the District Court had chosen the route now suggested by the State, implementation of the remedial order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution. 1341, as the injunction would require the collection of additional taxes, not inhibit the collection of taxes. 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. ] As we discuss infra, at 45, 28 U.S.C. Second, it was held that the writ of mandamus would not lie to compel the collection of taxes when there was no person against whom the writ could operate. Cf. (c) The modifications are not invalid under the Tenth Amendment, since that Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, address. There are strong arguments against the validity of such a plan. Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. [495 to Pet. U.S. 1206 63a. [495 421 (WD Mo. [495 Const., Art. Rather, it found only that the taxation orders were necessary to fund the particular remedy it had devised. U.S. 33, 57] The court ordered the state to fund salary increases for teachers and staff within the school district and to fund remedial magnet programs for so long as student achievement scores stayed at or below national averages. (1963); Western Pacific Railroad Case, 102 denied, U.S. 816 Brief for Respondents at 7, Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (No. The purpose of the position was to "solicit community support and involvement" in the District Court's desegregation plan. Footnote 13 But these items are a part of legitimate political debate over educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality. U.S. 218 If the Court is to take upon itself the power to tax, respect for its own integrity demands that the power be exercised in support of true constitutional principle, not "suburban comparability" and "visual attractiveness. Consequently, Rule 35(c) specifically provides that the filing of a suggestion for The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under 1988 against a State to compensate for delay in payment. [495 (1964). 20. U.S., at 233 98 During the 15 years that followed the Supreme Court's momentous school desegregation decision in br, Missouri Tech: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri State University: Narrative Description, Missouri State University: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri Southern State University: Tabular Data, Missouri Southern State University: Narrative Description, Missouri Southern State University: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Humes 115 U.S. 512 (1885), Missouri Ex Rel.
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